the task of appropriately implementing regulatory oversight by governments
to address multi-jurisdictional problems such as environmental
contamination, climate change, and communicable disease control.20 These
evolving theories of regulation provide insight into the evolution of
regulatory governance in the U.S., including public health governance.21
Attacks on redundancy pervade these debates, arising indirectly in the guise
of concerns about efficiency, overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, and
coexisting legal obligations.22 Traditional examinations of public
administration have been skeptical of redundancy in system design and
institutional structure, suggesting the elimination or minimization of
Critics argue that redundant systems or legal requirements prevent clear,
efficient, and streamlined outcomes.24 According to this view, governance
should use the fewest resources or apply the least regulation of an activity to
achieve a stated goal.25 In a society increasingly reliant upon logistical
tautness and skyrocketing productivity, redundancy has become anathema.
The impetus to do more with less animates not only private sector attempts
to wring efficiencies from their workforce and production processes, but also
government agencies facing budget shortfalls. This is noted in the context of
overlap in federal regulations:
Longstanding conventional wisdom holds that regulatory overlap entails
waste and therefore should be eliminated whenever found. A standard
prescription in efforts toward regulatory reform, for example, is to rid the
government of duplicative agency programs. Criticisms of regulatory
1567 (2012); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243 (2005).
20. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008);
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N. Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 130 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).
21. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007) (examining federalism issues
arising during the response to Hurricane Katrina).
22. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (2011).
23. See Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and
Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 348 (1969) (noting that even skeptics of administrative
dogmas have continued to dogmatically advocate for the elimination of redundancy, citing to
Francis W. Coker, Dogmas of Administrative Reform, 16 AM. POL.SCI. REV. 399 (1922)).
24. See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757 (2003); Marisam, supra