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of a non-exclusive license to certain patented technologies essential for development and commercialization of certain products to all requesters;190 andthegrant of non-exclusive license of certain technologyand patent rights related to specific therapies.191 Onedetailedconsentorderrequiredtherenegotiationoflicenseandsupply agreements with a third party to allow that third party to operate as an independent competitor by eliminating control over the product, restricting the type of information obtainable about the drug, and allowing the third party to compete in the development of another product.192 Another required changing the licensing agreement for specific products and eliminating reporting arrangements to assure that the acquirer does not obtain competitively-sensitive information.193 Yet another required the acquirer to license product formulations and production technology to a third party within a specific timeframe.194 Finally, one required the relinquishment of any claim to first-filer marketing exclusivity.195
One consent order required the maintenance of confidentiality of all marketing information for aspecific product.196
190.Se e id. at 61 (noting that Novartis “was required to grant to all requesters a non- exclusive license to certain patented technologies essential for development and commercialization of gene therapy products”). 191.Se e id. (“Novartis also was required to grant a non-exclusive license of certain technology and patent rights related to specific therapies for cancer, GVHD, and hemophilia to a Commission-approved licensee.”). 192.Se e id. at 46 (“The order requires Pharmacia to renegotiate its license and supply agreement with Novartis to allow Novartis to operate as an independent competitor by eliminating the control Pfizer would have over Novartis’s product, restricting the type of information Pfizer would be able to obtain about Deramaxx, and allowing Novartis to compete with Pfizer in the development of a second generation canine arthritis product.”). 193.Se e id. at 55 (“The order required changing the licensing agreement for cytokines and eliminating reporting arrangements to assure that American Home Products does not obtain competitively-sensitive information.”). 194.Se e id. at 56 (“The order required [Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.] to license dicyclomine formulations and production technology to a third party within 12 months . . . .”). 195. FTC Settles Charges That Actavis’s Proposed $8.5 Billion Acquisition of Warner Chilcott Would be Anticompetitive, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www. ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-settles-charges-actavis%E2%80%99s- proposed-85-billion-acquisition (“[T]he proposed order requires Actavis to relinquish its claim to first filer marketing exclusivity for generic Lo Loestrin FE and Atelvia products to preserve the incentives of the companies currently leading the patent litigations against Warner Chilcott related to those products.”). This exclusivity is technically rewarded by the FDA rather than the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, but the exclusivity similarly acts as a means to exclude others from the market space for the statutorily-provided 180 days. 196. FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 62, at 50–51 (“The order required Warner to end its co-promotion agreement with Forest, return all confidential information regarding Celexa to Forest, maintain the confidentiality of all Celexa marketing information . . . .”).